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“To think, act, vote, and speak for ourselves”: Black Democrats 
and black “agency” in the American South after Reconstruction 
 
In late September 1885, a black convention was held in the Virginian town of 
Lynchburg. It was an election year in the state: a gubernatorial campaign that pitted 
the Republican candidate, John S. Wise, against Democrat Fitzhugh Lee, the nephew 
of Confederate general, Robert E. Lee. Both candidates needed the black vote, a fact 
that the African American conventioneers knew all to well. In their address, the 
delegates emphasised their gratitude towards the Republican Party for their role in 
abolishing slavery through the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, and for their support 
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (which for the first time protected the 
citizenship rights of all Americans). Yet times had moved on, they argued; now was 
the time for African Americans, as free-people, “to think, act, vote, and speak for 
ourselves”. This had become apparent, the address stated, since the Republicans had 
“practically abandoned us”. The sense now was that black southerners had to work 
with white southerners in this post-Reconstruction world and embrace their version of 
the immediate past. Rather than considering Reconstruction to be a worthy effort in 
creating a more equal society, the conventioneers, using the language of white 
southerners, instead referred to the post-war period as “the dark days of 
Reconstruction”.i   
 The Lynchburg convention is significant because it revealed how some black 
southerners after Reconstruction wanted to break with the past and bring to an end 
their support for the Republican Party. Their feeling of abandonment alluded to the 
Republicans’ increasing lack of interest toward the former slaves, which had been 
made evident by the federal withdrawal from the South over the course of the 1870s. 
This had resulted in the restoration of southern “home rule” and the return to power of 
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the Democrats. In addition, the decision of the predominantly Republican Supreme 
Court’s decision two years previously, which had declared the 1875 Civil Rights Act 
as unconstitutional, reflected the growing white counter-reaction to Reconstruction. 
This decision was met with widespread opposition from African Americans, who 
knew all-to-well how it significantly undermined the effectiveness of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in upholding civil rights in the South.  
The convention’s address was an unambiguous statement in support of 
independent voting, for by the mid-1880s, any discussion of alternatives to the 
Republican Party was situated within a discourse of “independent voting”. In practice, 
this meant embracing the Democratic option, yet the term “independent” was 
important because it implied (perhaps naively in the context of the American South) 
that African Americans could be agents of their own political destiny in the South. As 
the Lynchburg convention reveals, there were some African Americans who wished 
to end their “unqualified support” for the Republican Party and at least consider 
working with white (Democratic) southerners.ii  
This essay will offer some preliminary remarks regarding African Americans 
who supported the Democrats. I argue that a study of black Democrats after 
Reconstruction forces us to reconsider what we mean by African American “agency” 
in the post-bellum South.iii We need to know much more about black conservative 
men who chose to support the Democrats, and situate any analysis in terms of the 
broader issues of race, class, gender and region. Local concerns determined the level 
of support, and whether support for the Democrats would come as a political bargain 
(usually in the form of a “fusion” ticket) or from direct political affiliation (in some 
cases with the promise of patronage).iv The Lynchburg convention came at a high-
water point for black “independent” voting in the Old Dominion, and in the South 
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more generally. As this essay will reveal, black support for the Democrats would 
always be limited: both from a lack of white Democratic commitment, and as a result 
of open hostility from black Republicans. 
It is understandable that historians have generally avoided studying black 
Democrats, given the fact that their numbers are hard to quantify. Those of the 
Dunning “school” of the early twentieth century, such as Walter L. Fleming’s 
1905 work, Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama, praised such individuals 
for their heroism in the face of black Republican opposition. A more balanced 
account emerged in the mid-1950s with an article by the noted historian of black 
America, August Meier. Yet Meier’s article, along with Lawrence Grossman’s 
1976 work, The Democratic Party and the Negro, predominantly focused on the 
northern wing of the party, whereas Randall Wood’s article on C.H.J. Taylor, a 
prominent black attorney, concentrates on black independents in Kansas and at 
the national level. By and large, historians from the 1960s onward have played 
down southern black support for the Democrats – discounting the notion of 
blacks voluntarily being involved with groups like the Red Shirts in South 
Carolina. Joel Williamson’s After Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina during 
Reconstruction is a case in point here, a work published in 1965 that, 
understandably for the time, wanted to counter the racist underpinning of the 
Dunning-era scholarship.v 
There are signs, however, that the debate has shifted a little, taking into 
account the local context. Edmund Drago’s Hurrah for Hampton!, for example, 
focuses on the black Red Shirts: African Americans in South Carolina who 
supported the Democratic candidate for governor, Wade Hampton, during the 
1876 state election. Drago does not really place these black Democrats within the 
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broader context of Reconstruction-era politics, however, nor does he analyse in 
any detailed way the motivation of black leaders. Likewise, John Giggie’s work 
on black political activity in post-Reconstruction Arkansas, while the most 
detailed study to date on black Democrats, has less to say on what motivated 
African Americans to support the Democrats in the first place. Giggie’s analysis 
is set within the context of the black church, one that focuses on the close 
relationship between African Americans’ religious and political life. His analysis 
concentrates on the 1888 state election, specifically on how the political activism 
of black church members, especially of black women, was central to the state’s 
broader electoral politics.vi  
What follows, therefore, is an exploration of black Democracy that takes the 
agency of the principal actors into account. It would be an error to simply assume that 
all black Democrats were duped into supporting the Democracy. Bribery and coercion 
were certainly present, and accounted for a large number of supposedly Democratic 
votes cast by African Americans, but this is to discount human agency in all its 
guises. As Walter Johnson notes on slavery, resistance cannot solely define agency; 
collaboration also has to be considered part of agency. This broader notion of human 
agency can be extended forward to Reconstruction and beyond. Like any politician, 
many of these men were opportunists, sensing which way the wind was blowing and 
then following it. In the years after Reconstruction, political deals with Southern 
whites were deemed by some black leaders as necessary if they were to retain any 
kind of influence. For others, as in the case of the Red Shirts, associating with the 
Democrats gave them status or the chance of patronage.vii 
 
BLACK AGENCY 
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Determining why some black men chose to support the party that had defended 
slavery, that was not the party of Lincoln, is certainly a challenge. For one thing, the 
dividing line between free will and coercion is never clear-cut. The level of support is 
also hard to quantify, for the number of African Americans who voted for the 
Democrats were invariably inflated or deflated depending on where the figures are 
found. And that is without getting on to the subject of electoral fraud.  
Yet there can be no denying the fact that the vast majority of African 
Americans who voted Democrat in the late nineteenth century did so as a result of 
intimidation. This was the image portrayed in the national press, and is supported by 
an abundance of evidence.viii Those who chose to support the Democrats rather than 
being forced to (and the difference between these was well-known), carried the risk of 
social ostracism at best, physical violence at worst.ix 
 The majority of black Democrats in this period were from the black elite: 
men who were usually freeborn, of some social standing, and who were 
businessmen or clergymen. Many of these men had built up an economic base, 
which they wanted to preserve at all costs. They were therefore more 
conservative in their outlook than those formerly enslaved, who wanted radical 
land reform; their own “forty acres and a mule”. Class divisions therefore had 
“political implications.” African American historian and sociologist W.E.B. Du 
Bois identified three types of black leader: those who were petty bourgeois, 
setting their sights on wealth creation; those who were educated and serving the 
broader nation “without regard to mere race lines”; and those whom he labelled 
“idealists” who advocated black self-determination, so that black Americans 
would be “on a par with the whites.”x  
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While these groups may have had some degree of overlap, it can be said that 
most black Democrats fell into the first category identified by Du Bois. Freeborn 
William B Scott of Tennessee is perhaps representative of this group. He had been a 
newspaper editor since 1865 and had established a Democrat-supporting newspaper in 
1879. Scott was disillusioned with the Republicans’ approach to national and state 
issues, arguing that the party wanted to maintain their political ascendancy above all 
else. Writing in 1882, he opposed the Republicans’ efforts to “centralize the 
government, its protective tariff policy…it builds up the few at the expense of the 
many, because it fosters monopolies of all kinds…”xi 
It must be remembered that many of these more conservative African 
Americans had initially supported the Republican Party. Indeed, a conservative streak 
had run through much of black political activity in the early years of Reconstruction, 
even among the non-elite. Shortly after the end of the Civil War, black Alabamians 
met in Mobile, the majority of whom were clergymen. The delegates to the Mobile 
convention had been selected by meetings held across the state, so were, to a point, a 
representative group. The tone of the Mobile convention was summered up when the 
delegates called for “peace, friendship, and good will toward all men – especially 
toward our white fellow-citizens among whom out lot is cast,” as well as 
acknowledging the “new obligations” they now faced to be good citizens. Moderation 
was therefore the order of the day.xii  
As Reconstruction waned in the South, so too did support for the Republicans 
from some of these more conservative African Americans. Virginian Jesse Dungee, a 
Baptist clergyman from Richmond, provides a useful case study here. Dungee had 
originally served as a Republican in the Virginian House of Delegates in the early 
1870s before becoming a Democrat in 1876. In an open letter to the leading white 
 7 
daily in the state, Dungee outlined his disillusionment with the Republican Party. He 
was fed up with the way in which they had been used as “political tools” and the way 
this fostered hostility between whites and blacks. In addition, he blamed the 
Republicans for the financial mismanagement of state finances, and implicated them 
in the failure of the Freedmen’s Bank some two years earlier.  
Dungee thus focused on economic issues pertinent to both African Americans 
as a group and as fellow Virginians to win over his audience. He believed that the best 
way forward was for black Virginians to “make full and manly reconciliation” with 
southern whites.xiii Moreover, in order to gain some kind of credibility among black 
Virginians, Dungee even claimed in the letter that he had once been a slave. He was, 
in fact, freeborn, but his attempt to appeal to former slaves is revealing for it was an 
attempt by a black Democrat to try and counter their elitist image; one they could 
never quite shake off.xiv 
 Disillusionment with the Republican Party was a clear motivation for some, 
and as Dungee implied in his letter, reconciliation with southern whites was required. 
In the months after the Compromise of 1877, the political deal brokered in 
Washington that officially ended Reconstruction in the South, the northern press 
regarded black Democrats as harbingers of peace, “breaking” the colour line in the 
South. This desire for peace was made evident in a number of southern states. In 
South Carolina, for example, the restoration of “home rule” following the election of 
1876 witnessed the election of southern paternalist Wade Hampton as governor. 
Hampton recruited a number of African American men to join his Red Shirts during 
the election campaign with the promise of peace. The black Red Shirts are an 
exception to the elitist profile set out earlier for the majority were poor, black farmers 
who had been slaves. Echoing the sentiments of Dungee, the Hampton campaign 
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stressed that African Americans were southerners, too, with “a common love of land 
and place.”xv   
The desire for interracial harmony often went hand-in-hand with 
disillusionment with the Republican Party. Black Tennessee lawyer and ex-slave 
Alfred A. Froman, for instance, argued that since the Republican Party had abandoned 
African Americans, the only option left to them was to work with southern whites. It 
was “nonsense,” wrote Froman in January 1885, that African Americans “being poor, 
dependent, uneducated, should be trained to disregard their interest, and to wield their 
votes against the very men from who [sic] they get employment, only for the sake of 
being called a Republican.”xvi It was in African Americans’ best interests, reasoned 
Froman, they not only work with southern white Democrats, but chose to vote for 
them, too. This was echoed at a black Democratic conference held in Montgomery, 
Alabama, in 1892. As one of the conference’s resolutions stated: “For a Negro to vote 
against these men, would be for him to go against himself; to vote with these men 
would be to go for his own interest, and to down race prejudice and race 
antagonism.”xvii  
Yet there is another common trend in all the examples noted here: African 
Americans had to instigate such peaceful relations, not southern whites. The white 
press encouraged this. “Colored democracy of Lafourche! Wake up, organize your 
clubs, and with the aid of our good citizens go to work and secure the exercise of your 
rights,” shouted one white Louisianan paper, “so that in November next you may 
contribute in restoring peace, order, and prosperity in our land of promise.”xviii 
African Americans were thus central to restoring peaceful relations, so thought 
whites, for they were the very group who were having a destabilizing effect on 
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southern politics. Indeed, promises were made that those African Americans who 
formed and joined such clubs would be protected in their rights.xix  
As this reveals, black clubs were encouraged by whites to help mobilise the 
black vote. Such clubs had been in existence since the time that the freedmen gained 
the right to vote. In August 1868, during the presidential election campaign, and the 
first in which black southerners could vote, a Democratic meeting was held in a 
theater in Montgomery, Alabama. This was a biracial meeting: African Americans 
delivered speeches in support of the Democrats, and were members of the state’s 
Colored Conservative Club. In a highly ritualised way, echoing what they experienced 
in church, a number of black men walked up to the stand to be converted, adding their 
names to the party faithful. Music was performed at the event by a black band, a 
common feature of such occasions.xx The majority of African Americans, however, 
voted the Republican ticket in the presidential election that fall. 
 Four years later, a Greeley and Brown Club was founded in the city. Believing 
that the Liberal-Republican ticket (a national coalition of disaffected Republicans and 
Democrats led by Horace Greeley of the New York Tribune) would be the best means 
for African Americans to be secure in their rights, the resolutions passed by this club, 
reprinted in full in the leading white daily, affirmed their loyalty to the South and that 
common interest united white and black southerners. The men associating with this 
club used the language of the Republicans against them, making reference to the 
alleged subversive nature of the Union League, the Republican clubs in the South that 
politically mobilized African Americans. The last of the Greeley and Brown Club’s 
resolutions revealed both black and white Democrat concerns: “we oppose all secret 
organizations for political purposes, or any party that slanders or proscribes men 
because of their party principles.”xxi The naivety of these men is all too apparent here, 
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given the far more extensive use of intimidation and outright violence used by white 
Democrats against black Republicans.  
Black Democratic clubs would become most extensive in the state elections 
that ended Reconstruction in a number of southern states in the mid-1870s, most 
notably in Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina. A good case study of the 
symbolic power of these clubs, however, can be found in Mississippi. In the election 
year of 1875, African American members of these clubs were able to take part in 
processions held during the election campaign. Pledges were made that they would be 
protected from black Republicans and secure in their employment. Flags, badges and 
uniforms, among other paraphernalia, were distributed freely to members. The badges 
also became a means of defence or a means of ‘bossing’ other African Americans, as 
in the case of some members of the Democratic club in Lafayette County. In addition, 
some African Americans would be invited to social events like barbeques and picnics, 
usually to perform in bands, but at other times to speak, either on request or 
voluntarily. Since black men were not allowed to address the more formal state 
conventions, this became the only means by which they could contribute to the 
political discourse. So while black Democrats could not, by and large, take part in the 
running of the party behind the scenes, whites gave these men the opportunity to 
contribute in public, in both active and passive ways. Yet this reveals tokenism on the 
part of white Democrats, and the limited options for political determination on the 
part of African Americans. What mattered for white Democrats was their presence: to 
contain or control, once again, the political engagement of black men. What mattered 
to black Democrats was their presence at such events: it was one of the few avenues 
open to them for political engagement in the public sphere.xxii 
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Speaking at such events continued into the 1880s. In Alabama, for example, 
William Councill, one-time Republican turned Democrat, actively campaigned for the 
Democrats in the 1880 election, becoming a “stump speaker” and supporting them in 
his newspaper. Councill was not alone in his support in Alabama. African American 
lawyer James A. Scott, the editor of another black newspaper in the state, the 
Birmingham (later Montgomery) Advance, also supported the Democrats. Scott had 
been a Democrat since the mid-1870s and was one of the few African Americans to 
attend a Democratic state convention. At the 1880 election he declared that the 
Republicans were no longer the same party of Lincoln – the political world of 
emancipation had gone. What Scott was implying here was that African Americans 
had to adapt to the changing political environment.xxiii Such a view was echoed six 
years later in an anonymous letter to the Huntsville Gazette. The only reason some 
blacks voted for the Democrats, the correspondent argued, was because of their 
disillusionment with the Republican Party over its sincerity towards upholding black 
rights.xxiv 
 Indeed, at the national level, the 1880s was a decade of political change. In 
1884 the Democrats won the White House with election of Grover Cleveland. In the 
run up to the election, the Colored Citizen, a black newspaper based in Montgomery, 
Alabama, pointed out that if the state Democratic Party would assure blacks that their 
vote would be counted fairly, African Americans would consider supporting them. 
The ultimate goal for both sides, the paper contended, was for more friendly relations 
between white and black southerners.xxv  
 
LYNCHBURG CONVENTION 
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Cleveland’s administration was influential in making some African Americans more 
amenable to the Democracy. When the Lynchburg convention met at the end of 
September 1885, it set out to present itself as an opposition meeting to the Republican 
Party, and thus translate changes within the national political climate to a local 
context. Its target was the state’s Republican leader, former Confederate William 
Mahone, who they believed represented a divisive past and who was not helping 
black Virginians in their efforts to promote harmonious race relations. Those present 
at Lynchburg including freeborn John B. Syphax, from Arlington, who was a member 
of an influential black family in Washington, D.C., and Rosier D. Beckley, who held 
a federal position in Washington, D.C. In his address as chairman, Beckley stressed 
how the gathering was not affiliated to any political party but stressed the need for 
African Americans to think for themselves unhindered by party loyalties.xxvi  
While the convention made it clear that they were not a Democratic 
convention, not everyone saw it that way. A correspondent to the New York Freeman, 
who wrote regularly from Norfolk, Virginia, regarded those present as “Colored 
Democrats”, unrepresentative of black Virginians at large. Indeed, the Lynchburg 
convention was generally dismissed as a talking shop for disgruntled office-seekers. 
The African American Richmond Planet, noted: 
We repudiate the actions of the “Colored Convention” recently held at 
Lynchburg so far as it professed to represent the colored people of this State. It 
was nothing more nor less than a few men who represented nobody but 
themselves, and who were in the pay of the Democratic bosses. We know 
whereof we speak and are prepared to substantiate what we say.  
George Freeman Bragg, editor of the Republican-supporting black newspaper, the 
Petersburg Lancet, echoed such a view. The convention had been representative to a 
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point, he pointed out, but it had been “burdened with retired politicians who have 
pretty much outlived their usefulness and remain barnacles and impediments to the 
progress of the race.” While the address was “sensible in many respects,” he thought 
it “indicative of the disappointment and hard luck of some unfortunate colored 
politicians who sadly regard dealing in politics the means of earning a living.”xxvii 
The lack of patronage was always a sore point among many southern black 
Republicans, and became more pronounced with the rise of the ‘lily-white’ 
Republicans in the 1880s. These were Republicans who split away from the biracial 
coalition that had been created in the South during Reconstruction and created a 
whites-only party as a way to attract more support from southern whites. In some 
cases, Democrats gave patronage to their black supporters. In Norfolk County, 
Virginia, for example, African Americans who had supported the Democrat Fitzhugh 
Lee for governor in the 1885 election were offered political positions. T. Thomas 
Fortune, the editor of the African American newspaper, the New York Age, made an 
example of those black Virginians who had supported Lee, considering this evidence 
that African Americans “were losing confidence in the politicians’ and ‘relying more 
and more upon their own discretion and leadership.”xxviii 
Fortune was the leading black voice in the 1880s calling for African 
Americans to vote independently, articulated in his 1884 book entitled Black and 
White. This was following in the wake of a relatively small but vocal group of 
northern black leaders who in the 1870s had begun to question the Republican 
Party’s commitment to defending the rights of African Americans. Fortune was 
one of many younger black leaders who had emerged by the 1880s, challenging 
African Americans’ attachment to the Republican Party, and calling for black 
self-determination in politics.xxix  
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Fortune became a forceful proponent of seeking political alternatives, however 
even he had lost faith in the Democrat’s commitment by the end of the 1880s. As he 
wrote in the New York Age in January 1891: 
Whenever the question is reduced to ‘shall the Negro enjoy his full rights 
under the Constitution?’ only the mercenary Negro will be found in the future 
on the Democratic side of the fence in national and congressional elections.xxx 
Despite an attempt to revitalize the political debate in the 1880s, Fortune’s attempts to 
encourage African Americans to vote without loyalty to a particular party never really 
materialised in any meaningful way. He never grasped the local complexities of black 
politics in his efforts to recreate southern politics in the image of the North. It was one 
thing to vote for the Democrats in the North, where African Americans were able to 
vote relatively freely, but quite another in the South.xxxi Moreover, the southern 
Democrats could not mobilize black voters in the same way as the Republicans.  
Black Democrats were therefore always a minority, especially in the South. In 
response to another convention call by black Democrats two years later, to be held in 
the Virginian town of Danville, the Weekly Pelican of New Orleans dismissed the 
notion that black Democrats were prolific, at least in Louisiana. “The Negroes of 
Louisiana have no desire, nor do they propose, to join the party of treason and 
political disfranchisement.” It added: “They have no desire to nest with the 
Democratic party – the party of midnight raids and election frauds.”xxxii This was a 
particularly pertinent comment given that Danville had witnessed a racial massacre 
some four years earlier that had brought an end to state control by the Readjusters: a 
different kind of “independent” politics that consisted of a biracial coalition of 
disaffected Democrats and black Republicans. 
 15 
That members of the Virginian black elite, like John Syphax, chose the 
independent route suggests an inherent elitism in the state’s black political 
independence movement. This movement reached its peak in Virginia in September 
1887 when Rosier D. Beckley, a leading figure at the Lynchburg convention in 1885, 
and other black Democrats, formed the Independent Club of Colored Virginians. This 
followed the holding of another black convention which had met in Danville in April 
1887 “to organize the Negro vote into an independent political power,” voting for 
those who would “agree to advance the industrial interests of the race.”xxxiii There was 
growing sentiment against the white Republican boss, William Mahone, and the club 
fed into this opposition.  
Based, initially, in Washington, D.C., the club’s objectives included an 
upholding of black rights, an end to prejudice (including a veiled criticism of 
Mahone’s tactics), and a demonstration of the core differences between the 
Republicans and Democrats. The club’s manifesto warned of the danger of a 
Republican victory in the state and declared the group would assist the Democrats to 
victory in the forthcoming state elections. By assistance, it meant delivering the black 
vote to the Democrats.xxxiv 
 The Washington Bee thought the club ‘peculiar’ and had short shrift for 
Beckley. It regarded him as a failed office holder, who had switched from the 
Republicans to the Democrats in order to obtain patronage in Washington, and had 
then fallen out with the Democrats when they failed to recognise him. It is likely that 
Beckley wanted a promotion, for he had been appointed as the Democratic 
Doorkeeper of the House of Representatives in January 1884, and no evidence has 
been found to suggest that he had been promoted since then.xxxv The Bee was also 
keen to point out that Beckley had no support in the Old Dominion, and that the other 
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members of the club’s committee were unknown. The main point the Bee wished to 
stress, however, was to ask how any African American could support the Democrats 
after what had happened at Danville four years earlier, when a massacre of African 
Americans had taken place in the town which influenced the state election in favour 
of the Democrats.xxxvi
xxxvii
 Two years later the paper wondered out loud what the state 
Democratic boss really thought of men like Beckley.  
The black press therefore picked up on the important issue of patronage, 
where opportunities to gain federal patronage in Washington had emerged as a result 
of the new Democratic administration. The creation of black Democratic clubs in 
Washington, D.C., for instance, would have influenced black Democrats in Virginia. 
Richmond’s proximity to the capital meant that it was influenced by political trends 
emanating from there, and is an example of how Virginia’s political situation was 
unique to the South. 
Supporters of the Democratic President, Grover S. Cleveland, founded one 
such club in Washington, the Colored Club of Ward 11. At its conference in 1885, the 
committee of resolutions noted how “designing politicians” had stirred up the rumour 
that the election of a Democratic president would turn back the clock for blacks, and 
stated that Cleveland had so far done more to remove the colour line than any other 
president.xxxviii It is interesting that the language used here, such as “designing 
politicians,” was similar to that used by the opponents of black Democrats. 
The club would have gained some support from the city’s black elite, made up 
of the “old families” whose members had been largely free before the war, and were 
influenced by upper-class white society in their lifestyle.xxxix Family background was 
all-important to this group, founded on the antebellum experience – “their place in the 
slave system, their role in opposing it, and the extent to which their families had been 
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free from it.”xl Education was one defining feature of the group, but this was more 
noticeable in the rising middle class rather than of the elite, whose intimate 
experience of slavery was often a few generations removed. That such a group made 
up much of the nationally known and the state black leadership is perhaps no surprise, 
with their sense of noblesse oblige. Their involvement in the cause for equal rights 
demonstrated “their access to the white power structure,” while they demonstrated 
through their lives the possibilities of black uplift.xli This symbolism was a feature of 
all black leaders, however the distance between the elite and the black masses was 
often considerable, and made black Democrats’ efforts at garnering wider support that 
much harder. 
The close relationship which black Democrats wished to establish with the 
“better class” of whites reflected a change in what black leaders held to be 
qualifications for citizenship, which itself was a reflection of broader, white 
notions of what constituted American citizenship. As Kevin Gaines points out, 
the move from the earlier “unconditional claims” to citizenship advocated by 
black leaders during Reconstruction to the conditional claims of “racial uplift” 
by the end of the century, revealed an “intraracial division” between lower and 
upper class blacks. Such an uplift ideology therefore legitimized the black elites’ 
claim to citizenship, because they considered that they had earned such rights. 
This “bourgeois evolutionism” regarding African American claims to citizenship 
was argued by many black leaders by the 1890s, exemplified in the 
accommodating strategy pursued by Booker T. Washington, the Alabama-based 
leader and head of the Tuskegee Institute. Yet a study of black Democrats before 
the 1890s reveals a similar strategy. This rested on what another historian has 
referred to as the “Good Negro” strategy of appealing to the white elite, whereby 
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the black elite contrasted themselves with the more militant and less deferential 
“Bad Negroes”. However, political participation in the public sphere was still 
possible in the 1880s, which is why some black conservatives advocated support 
for the Democrats. By the 1890s, the “racial uplift” ideology advocated by black 
conservatives was distinctly non-political, reflecting the diminishing 
opportunities for African Americans to participate in southern politics.xlii 
 Black Democrats, as with other members of the black elite, can hardly be said 
to be representative of the majority of African Americans in the South in this period. 
Without a mass following from the black non-elite, therefore, black Democratic clubs 
in Virginia and elsewhere never gained the same kind of foothold as did their 
Republican counterparts, even if they began to organize at a national level. In the 
South, black Democratic clubs were derided in the black press.xliii The lack of support 
for the Democrats can be explained, in part, by the growing disillusionment among 
black Democrats. The black press picked up on this:  
The average Negro Democrat looks seedy. He is usually attired in a threadbare 
suit and wears a wornout [sic] expression all over him. He smells like a 
distillery, too. He has a lend-me-a-quarter look in his eyes. What’s the matter? 
He boasts of the richness of the Democratic vineyard. They forage, he tells us, 
on the fat of the land. Then why should he look so hungry and lean and 
demoralized? The Negro Democracy should brace up and resolve to be a 
man.xliv 
Yet by far the most significant reason for the lack of black support for the Democrats 
was the result of Republican opposition to them: most prominently, from black 
women and the church.  
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OPPOSITION TO BLACK DEMOCRATS 
From the moment African Americans gained the vote in the late 1860s, voting for the 
Republican Party became something of a religion, both figuratively and literally, as 
revealed by Democratic meeting held in the Montgomery theater. Southern black 
leaders picked up on this. Writing during the election campaign of 1892, the black 
Virginian lawyer James Hayes thought it high time that black voters should be 
allowed to vote for whomsoever they chose. He noted how any deviation from the 
Republican Party was regarded as sinful. Choosing to support the Democrats carried 
the real risk of social ostracism, no matter who you were: a situation more acute in the 
South as it ever was in New York or even Washington, D.C.xlv 
Oppostion to black Democrats was most prominent within the political space 
of the church. Jesse Dungee, targeted those black clergy who opposed him, labelling 
them “Radicals”. ‘Why do they use their churches for such unholy purposes,’ asked 
Dungee, ‘and then pretend that they have nothing to do with politics?’ By way of 
reply, one black clergyman stated that Dungee’s “denominational tenets” had made 
him “unpopular.”xlvi Another clergyman stated that he was a liar, his labelling of 
specific ministers as “malicious;” adding, with a note of sarcasm: 
Sir, does it not seem to be a little strange that the learned, wise, and reverend 
gentleman should take such a course as this to get himself into the favour of 
the white people of this city? Does he think that the white people of this city 
are so ignorant that they do not know a hypocrite when they see him? If he 
does, he is very much mistaken, for there are high, respectable people in this 
city that had rather have a dog in their presence than a hypocrite, be he white 
or black.xlvii 
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The politics of the black church was such that anyone who deviated from the 
Republican fold was either reigned in or removed. Dungee, for instance, was 
eventually driven from his church: whether he was forced to or whether he simply 
abandoned his congregation, is open to debate. One black Republican newspaper 
which covered Virginian affairs seemed to imply the latter. In a letter to the People’s 
Advocate, a correspondent regarded Dungee as a passionate orator, although regarded 
his lack of education as a cause for his speeches being rather hit or miss affairs. 
Dungee’s “moral strength” was questioned also, a claim supported by the reaction to 
Dungee’s comments on his fellow clergymen. He was also considered to be indecisive 
and lazy, although he was singled out as better than the average Black Democrat. The 
Democrats had not gained anything by bringing Dungee into their fold, the 
correspondent thought, whereas the Republicans had lost a potential leader.xlviii  
 This kind of ostracism continued throughout the 1880s. Charles Gordon, a 
black clergyman from Petersburg, Virginia, was ostracised for opposing the two 
Republican candidates in the Fourth Congressional election in 1888. It was reported 
by the Richmond Planet following the election that there was “much dissatisfaction” 
from other ministers with Gordon, for he had “voted the Democratic ticket or failed to 
support the Republican ticket”. Gordon admitted this to be the case, stating (so it was 
reported), “that they [fellow black ministers] were persecuting him on account of his 
politics”. Gordon tried to split away from the church, and take supporters in the 
congregation with him, but with little success. This affair does have echoes with 
Dungee’s attempts to break away from the Republicans in the mid 1870s, and the 
hostility towards him that such action provoked.xlix This was not unique to black 
conservatives in Virginia: members of the Missionary Baptist Corner Stone Church in 
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Arkansas, for example, dismissed its clergyman, James Fleshman, after it was proven 
that he had voted for the Democrats.l 
Ostracism was often closer to home. African American women were central to 
the policing of the black vote, ensuring that black men maintained their loyalty to the 
Republican Party. Considerable evidence for this can be found from Reconstruction 
onwards. Black women not only asserted themselves politically as church members, 
but in some cases clubs were formed, where women pledged that they would leave 
their husbands if they voted the Democratic ticket. Influencing how black men voted 
went beyond the home, such as during an election campaign in Alabama in 1874. 
After a black Democrat interrupted an outdoor Republican meeting outside 
Montgomery, Alabama, by declaring that the Republicans were lying to them, a 
number of women hurled a volley of verbal abuse towards the individual. Violence 
was only prevented when a white planter intervened and advised the Democrat to 
leave. Charles Nordoff, travelling through the state the following year, was told of 
incidents whereby Republican candidates would ask black women if they would leave 
their husbands if they voted for the Democrats.li 
Scenes like these were prevalent in other states and reveals the political action 
black women would take if necessary. Speaking before an 1884 Senate hearing 
investigating the Danville massacre in Virginia the previous fall, Violet King outlined 
what action she would take if her husband were found to be a Democrat. “I would just 
picke [sic] up my clothes and go to my father’s, if I had a father,” she told the 
committee, “or would go to work for 25 cents a day”. King repeatedly made the point 
that if a black man were found to have voted for the Democrats, they would have 
“sold” themselves: the legacy of the slavery therefore underlay any black support for 
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the Democrats.lii Such a view was reinforced twelve years later by African-American 
teacher and activist, Anna Julia Cooper: 
[T]he black woman can never forget – however lukewarm the party may to-
day appear – that is was a Republican president who struck the manacles from 
her own wrists and gave the possibilities of manhood to her helpless little 
ones; and to her mind a Democratic Negro is a traitor and a time-server. 
What these examples of ostracism demonstrate is the significance of the vote to 
African Americans. For black women, when black men went to vote, they were 
voting for them, too. African American women were demonstrating their own agency 
in political affairs, even if indirectly. The extent of this can be summed up well in 
Frances Ellen Watkins Harper’s poem, “Deliverance”: 
 Day after Day did Milly Green 
 Just follow after Joe, 
And told him if he voted wrong 
To take his rags and go. 
That such agency could be expressed in poetry reveals the extent of it: the audience of 
the poem would have been aware of its existence in order to understand the reference.  
The vote therefore held great symbolic value for African Americans: power to 
assert themselves as citizens when political office and economic advancement were 
not easy to come by. Women questioned the manhood of men who voted for the 
Democrats and classed them as traitors. The Republican black press often reinforced 
such messages. Following the defeat of the Readjusters in Virginia in 1883, the 
Petersburg Lancet blamed black Democrats for their defeat, calling them “dirty” and 
“scurrilous,” as well as “renegade colored men.” liii 
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Yet even those black Democrats who were prepared to renounce their party 
loyalties could be brought back in to the fold. In the late summer of 1888, the 
“leading colored Democrat of the South,” L. A. Martinet of New Orleans, resigned as 
editor of the Democratic newspaper, following a period of acute racial tension in the 
Pelican state. His letter was published on the front page of the Louisiana Standard, 
edited by black Republican T. B. Stamps, who referred to Martinet as “scathingly and 
manfully denouncing” the Democratic response (or lack thereof) to the recent 
massacre of African Americans in Iberia Parish. Martinet’s letter suggests the 
inevitability of disappointment that black Democrats faced concerning the 
commitment of their fellow whites. As Martinet summed it up succinctly: “our efforts 
to establish and maintain peace and harmony between the races have, it seems to me, 
not only proved futile, but may be, under the circumstances, considered officious.”liv  
 
CHANGING POLITICAL CLIMATE 
By the 1890s, the dynamics of southern political culture changed considerably with 
the Populist insurgency. Disillusioned non-elite whites sought to gain power over the 
mainstream state Democratic Party, with the assistance of black Republicans. Their 
efforts to woo black voters succeeded in some cases, such as North Carolina. In 
Alabama, their efforts backfired on them. The miners’ strike of 1894, more than any 
other event, led many black Alabamians to support the Democrats in that year’s 
gubernatorial election, and resulted in the election of Democrat William C. Oates to 
the Governor’s Mansion. The Republicans were so divided that they did not put 
forward a candidate for the office, but rather the lily white faction supported the 
Populist candidate.lv  
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The question to ask is that why, in a time when the Populists were at the peak 
in the state, did black voters support the Democracy? Or was this a case of mass 
fraud? Fraud was certainly charged at the Democrats, and it is more than likely that it 
did take place on wide scale, despite claims to the contrary.
lviii
lvi
 What is of interest is 
that the charges of fraud were systematically challenged. The Democrats were on the 
defensive, but also wanted it to make clear that the Populists were not as pro-black as 
some thought, at least in Alabama. For a start, the black and tan faction of the 
Republican Party, led by William Stevens, refused to support the Populists, with 
Stevens in the end voting for Oates. lvii More significant, however, was the support 
offered by many local black leaders who played a crucial role in Oates gaining 
widespread black support. The unease with which other black leaders (aside of 
Stevens) held the Populists was revealed both privately and publicly. Even before the 
1894 election, local black leader Jerry B. Blevins wrote of the Populists as “latter-day 
Confederates.”  However, in 1894, it appears that the black clergy played a greater 
role than the established black political leadership in swaying the black masses. A 
number of the clergy publicly supported Oates’ candidacy and told their 
congregations to vote accordingly, some of them also making speeches in favour of 
Oates.lix It was claimed by Oates that he received some 25,000 black votes in that 
election. Moreover, the violence surrounding a recent miners’ strike in the state 
encouraged further the black swing to Oates. Oates spoke against the strikers and 
declared that if elected Governor he would ensure that African American rights were 
protected. “These sentiments were applauded loudly by the colored voters present at 
place where he spoke,” Oates later wrote, oddly in the third person, “and it is a 
notorious fact that a greater number of colored voters at that election voted for him 
than ever voted for any democrat in the State prior thereto.”lx  
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 Virginia’s gubernatorial election of 1893 witnessed a similar turn by some 
African Americans towards the Democrats as an act of political expediency. The 
Negro Democratic League was at the forefront of encouraging black support for the 
Democratic candidate, Charles T. O’Ferrall, arguing that it was best for Virginian 
blacks to support “that class of white people that own and control everything.”lxi It is 
hardly surprising that the Democrats received an increase in black support, given the 
virtual non-existence of the Republican Party and the racist overtones of the Populists. 
As historian Charles Wynes succinctly puts it, the League’s resolution was “political 
despair speaking through the voice of economic expediency.”lxii  
As these examples from Alabama and Virginian demonstrate, choosing the 
Democrats over the Populists was simply siding with the lesser of two evils. Yet for 
some, supporting the Democrats continued to be about obtaining political patronage, 
and elitist. The Populists certainly held this view. As their national publication noted, 
somewhat sarcastically: 
The Negro democrat is a source of inspiration and joy to all who know him. 
He holds an office. Of course he does – that’s what he came for…The Negro 
democrat cares nothing for the poor and oppressed for his race. He treats the 
black laborer precisely as the white office-holder treats the white producer – 
with gushing fondness during the campaign and with contemptuous 
indifference after the election.lxiii 
Nevertheless, some in the black press did praise the actions of black Democrats. The 
most notable example was H. Clay Smith of Alabama, whom the Bee lauded as “a 
good politician and one of the most highly educated negroes from the south.” While 
not one of the long-standing patronage seekers that newspapers such as the Bee 
usually assailed, given that he was only 38 in 1893, he did have the support of the 
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recently re-elected president, Grover Cleveland. Smith was rewarded for such loyalty 
through his appointment to a federal position in Brazil; an appointment Smith later 
told Cleveland demonstrated that African Americans were being recognized by the 
Democratic administration.lxiv  
 By the end of the 1890s, calls were made on black Democrats to influence 
those white Democrats they helped to elect. Following the 1898 state elections in 
North Carolina, a correspondent to the Washington-based Colored American 
called on both black Democrats and “conservative Negro educators” to influence 
those Democratic members of the state legislature they had supported. The 
paper noted that one area they had to exert influence was over the introduction 
of railroad segregation. Such laws were already in place in the majority of 
southern states, except for the old Atlantic seaboard states like North Carolina, 
South Carolina and Virginia. The correspondent thought that black Democrats 
“owe it to themselves, their relatives and to the Negro race in the state, to see to 
it, that the democrats…do not put into operation…the infamous ‘Jim Crow car’ 
system.”lxv  
The fact that black Democrats could not prevent “certain white men” 
from pushing for the introduction of Jim Crow segregation reveals the limited 
returns for African Americans supporting the Democracy. Moreover, while the 
location of the aforementioned correspondent to the Colored American is 
unclear, the letter is made all the more extraordinary given the extensive 
violence surrounding the state election that year. The worst violence occurred at 
Wilmington, North Carolina, where a racial massacre took place. The 
implication of trying to influence the recently elected white Democrats to the 
state legislature appears to be a last-ditch attempt to try and check the 
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worsening racial climate in North Carolina, whereby the political avenues open 
to African Americans were becoming ever-narrower.lxvi 
The example of North Carolina reveals that for some African Americans, 
making the best out of a bad situation and simply holding on to what they had 
already gained from the Reconstruction era was their primary aim in politics. As 
this essay has revealed, this led a certain segment of the southern black public to 
support (or at least consider) the Democratic Party. Given the fact that African 
Americans had been disenfranchised in the majority of southern states by the 
end of the century, or facing the imminent prospect of such a situation, black 
Democrats by the 1890s were clearly fighting a loosing battle. Such a battle, they 
believed, needed to take place on the inside. The symbolic nature of black 
political leadership is revealed here, something that had clear implications for 
the political engagement of others. This appears less in protecting African 
Americans’ full political and civil rights, and more about finding areas of 
potential compromise. A crucial question considered by black Democrats was, 
therefore, whether it was better to have one black man working with whites than 
have none at all. 
Yet, the symbolic nature of black leadership did transcend party lines, 
which suggests that this was a feature of black leadership more generally. This 
can be seen with the equally conservative (although Republican) Booker T. 
Washington. As revealed earlier in this essay, the dividing line between black 
Republicans and Democrats was not always as clear-cut as perhaps has been 
assumed, given the relative ease with which men such as Jesse Dungee moved 
from the Republicans to the Democrats. Even so, such a course had 
consequences: not least in giving the wrong impression to whites that African 
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Americans were content with their situation, and thus ultimately selling African 
Americans short, politically.  
Self-interest certainly played a role here, as it does for any individual 
taking on a leadership role, yet did self-interest play a more prominent role in 
the decision-making process of black Democrats? Class considerations are 
important factor here, and the degree to which economic possibilities enabled 
political participation often rested on geographic location. While it was easier for 
northern blacks to support the Democrats, there were also intra-regional 
divisions within the South, not to mention urban-rural differences. It is no 
coincidence that black Democracy was able to emerge to the extent that it did in 
urban areas of the South, where African Americans were less tied economically 
to white landowners.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The key aspect of black independent politics in the 1880s was the varying 
degrees of hostility shown towards it from black Republicans. African 
Americans not only chose to support the Democracy, and that Republican votes 
were lost, but their numbers were sufficiently large to warrant a sustained 
response from their Republican counterparts. However, it would be an error to 
say the Democrats captured anything like a meaningful number of black votes 
honestly. Bribery and coercion were their main tools of gaining votes, not to 
mention electoral fraud in all its guises.  
This being said, we still need to investigate in a systematic way the extent 
of black Democratic support, for it would be an error to simply dismiss the 
significance of the political independence movement of the 1880s, with its call for 
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African American men to consider supporting the Democratic Party. Black 
agency needs to be explored to its full extent, to try and read between the lines of 
the Republican and Democratic sources. Either because of genuine conviction or 
political opportunism, southern black Democrats believed that turning away 
from the Republican Party meant a more secure future; both socially and 
economically. While comments by black Democrats might appear naïve, they 
themselves thought black Republicans were as naïve, thinking that their party 
cared for African Americans any more than the Democrats.  
While self-interest provides a motive for any political activity, it was even 
more of a consideration for black Democrats. This is perhaps best summed up by 
those clergymen who supported the Democrats, for it is clear that the majority of 
their congregations disagreed with their political point-of-view. Given the 
significance of the black church in the political mobilization of African American 
voters, black Democrats could never hope to be as representative of the broader 
black public than their Republican counterparts. As a result, this lack of 
representation, and therefore black constituency, meant that the leadership 
position of black Democrats was always going to be unstable and unsustainable.  
The phenomenon of black Democracy should perhaps not surprise us if 
we take a broader view of black agency. Agency is about self-interest: it does not 
necessarily follow that it will benefit others. Yet black Democrats considered that 
they were taking the longer view, considering that the only way to influence the 
political situation was to act from within the system. Given the nature of white 
racial attitudes in the late nineteenth century, this seems naïve at best; a short-
sighted approach that reveals the desperation of these men in their efforts to 
counter their perceived political emasculation by whites.  
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If we put aside the motivation of white Republicans and Democrats, what 
perhaps is more significant is that such a debate over political participation 
could be held at all in the post-Reconstruction South. For some, this meant 
working with a less-than-enthusiastic Republican Party. For others, it meant 
renouncing the Republican Party altogether. Southern black Democrats were an 
important feature of African American political culture in this period; for, if 
anything, they demonstrate the remarkable vitality of black politics in the public 
sphere, both male and female, in the post-Reconstruction South.  
                                                        
i
 Virginia Lancet, October 10, 1885. 
ii
 Ibid. 
iii
 My thinking on this has been influenced by Walter Johnson’s work on rethinking 
slave “agency”. See his article “On Agency,” Journal of Social History 37 (Fall 
2003): 113-124.  
iv
 The terms “Conservative” and “Democrat” are used interchangeably in this essay, 
as they were by contemporaries to differentiate from the “Radicals” (Republicans). 
v
 Walter Lynwood Fleming, Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama (New York, 
1905); There is little scholarship that focuses solely on black Democrats. The main 
examples are: August Meier, “The Negro and the Democratic Party, 1875-1915,” 
Phylon 17 (1956): 173-91; Lawrence Grossman, The Democratic Party and the 
Negro: Northern and National Politics, 1868-1892 (Urbana, 1976); Randall B. 
Woods, “C.H.J. Taylor and the Movement for Black Political Independence, 1882-
1896,” Journal of Negro History 67 (Summer 1982): 122-35; Joel Williamson, After 
Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina during Reconstruction (1965; rpt. Chapel Hill, 
1975), 342-43, 350-353, 406-412. 
vi
 Edmund Drago, ‘Hurrah For Hampton!’ Black Red Shirts in South Carolina during 
Reconstruction (Fayetteville, AK, 1998); John Giggie, “Disband him from the 
church’: African Americans and the Spiritual Politics of Disfranchisement in Post-
Reconstruction Arkansas,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 60 (2001): 245-264 
vii
 Drago, ‘Hurrah for Hampton!’; Johnson, “On Agency,” 116. 
viii
 A visual representation of this intimidation can be found in Harper’s Weekly, 
October 21, 1876. 
ix
 For the differences between those forced to vote for the Democrats and those who 
chose to, see: Nell Irvin Painter, Exodusters: Black Migration to Kansas after 
Reconstruction (1976; New York, 1979), 13. 
x
 W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction: An Essay toward a History of the part 
which Black Folk played in the attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-
1880 (1935; rpt. New York, 1956), 612. 
xi
 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New 
York, 1988), 546; Blount County Democrat, 29 Apr. 1882, quoted in Samuel 
Shannon, “Tennessee,” in Henry Lewis Suggs, ed., The Black Press in the South, 
1865-1979 (Westport, CN, 1983), 313-355 (quotation on 321). 
 31 
                                                                                                                                                              
xii
 Peter Kolchin, First Freedom: The Responses of Alabama’s Blacks to 
Emancipation and Reconstruction (Westport, CN, 1987), 152-53 (quotations on 153). 
xiii
 Eric Foner, Freedom’s Lawmakers: A Directory of Black Officeholders during 
Reconstruction (New York, 1993), 67; Richmond Dispatch, August 9, 1876.  
xiv
 Richmond Dispatch, August 9, 1876; Foner, Freedom’s Lawmakers, 67. See, also, 
Jack P. Maddex, The Virginia Conservatives: A Study in Reconstruction Politics 
(Chapel Hill, 1970), 197. 
xv
 Harper’s Weekly, December 8, 1877; Drago, 32. 
xvi
 Cleveland Gazette, January 3, 1885, quoted in Joseph H. Cartwright, The Triumph 
of Jim Crow: Tennessee Race Relations in the 1880s (Knoxville, TN, 1976), 59. 
xvii
 Montgomery Daily Advertiser, December 2, 1892, quoted in Horace Mann Bond, 
Negro Education in Alabama: A Study of Cotton and Steel (1939; Tuscaloosa, AL, 
1994), 141; Washington Bee, June 10, 1893.  
xviii
 Thibodeaux [La.] Sentinel, quoted in Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 
August 29, 1868. 
xix
 T. U. Bernard, First Vice-President of the Colored Democratic Club Number 1 
(Mobile, Alabama), was praised by the white Democratic press for always being “true 
to the South.” The implication here, of course, that by only supporting the Democrats 
could any one in the South be “true” to the region. Mobile Advertiser and Register, 
April 20, 1867, quoted in Kolchin, 142; Iberville [La.] South, quoted in Frank Leslie’s 
Illustrated Newspaper, August 29, 1868. 
xx
 Weekly Georgia Telegraph, August 28, 1868. 
xxi
 Montgomery Daily Advertiser, August 8, 1872, reprinted in Herbert Aptheker, ed., 
A Documentary History of the Negro People of the United States, Vol. 2: From the 
Reconstruction Era to 1910 (1951; New York, 1968), 567-68 (quotation on 568); see, 
also, Weekly Huntsville Advocate, August 9, 1872. 
xxii
 Vernon Lane Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi Politics, 1865-1890 (1947; New 
York, 1965), 185-87; Similar scenes occurred in Georgia and South Carolina: see 
Drago’s Hurrah for Hampton, as well as his Black Politicians and Reconstruction in 
Georgia: A Splendid Failure (Baton Rouge, 1982), 147. 
xxiii
 New York Sun, August 16, 1880; Montgomery Advance, September 11, 1880, 
quoted in Steven Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the 
Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration (Cambridge, MA, 2003), 388. 
xxiv
 Huntsville Gazette, September 25, 1886. 
xxv
 (Montgomery) Colored Citizen, May 3, 1884. 
xxvi
 Luther P. Jackson, Negro Officeholders in Virginia, 1865-1895 (Norfolk, VA, 
1945), 41, 61; Richmond Dispatch, October 1, 1885. 
xxvii
 New York Freeman, October 10, 1885; Richmond Planet, quoted in Cleveland 
Gazette, October 10, 1885; No extant copies of the Planet from this period have been 
found, so the extracts reprinted by the Gazette are all that remain. See, also: Richmond 
Planet, quoted in Cleveland Gazette, October 17, 1885; Petersburg Lancet, October 
10, 1885. 
xxviii
 Petersburg Lancet, November 28, 1885. See, also, Cleveland Gazette, November 
28, 1885; T. Thomas Fortune, The Negro in Politics: Some pertinent reflections on 
the past and present political status of the Afro-American, together with a cursory 
investigation into the motives which actuate partisan organizations (New York, 
1886), 69, reprinted in Shawn Leigh Alexander, ed., T. Thomas Fortune, the Afro-
American Agitator: A Collection of Writings, 1880-1928 (Gainesville, FL, 2008), 27-
73.   
 32 
                                                                                                                                                              
xxix
 T. Thomas Fortune, Black and White: Land, Labor, and Politics in the South 
(1884; rpt. New York, 1968); Shawn Leigh Alexander, An Army of Lions: The Civil 
Rights Struggle Before the NAACP (Philadelphia, 2012), 5. 
xxx
 Fortune quoted in Emma Lou Thornbrough, T. Thomas Fortune: Militant 
Journalist (Chicago, 1972), 103. 
xxxi
 Black support for the Democrats was more noticeable in the North. See, for 
example, a speech made by T. McCants Stewart, during the Harrison presidency, 
supported the Democrats. The Afro-American in Politics: An Address, October 27, 
1891 (New York, 1891). 
xxxii
 New Orleans Weekly Pelican, March 19, 1887. 
xxxiii
 Cleveland Gazette, April 2, 1887. 
xxxiv
 Washington Bee, September 10, 1887. 
xxxv
 Ibid.; Petersburg Lancet, January 19, 1884. 
xxxvi
 Washington Bee, September 10, 1887. 
xxxvii
 Ibid., August 24, 1889. 
xxxviii
 A Conference Held by the Colored Club of Ward 11, Washington, D.C., June 4, 
1885, Grover Cleveland Papers, Series 2, reel 5, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.  
xxxix
 William B. Gatewood, Aristocrats of Color: The Black Elite, 1880-1920 
(Bloomington, IN, 1990), ix-x. 
xl
 William B. Gatewood, “Aristocrats of Color: South and North, The Black Elite, 
1880-1920,” Journal of Southern History 54 (February 1988): 3-20 (quotation on 5). 
xli
 Ibid., 7. 
xlii
 Kevin K. Gaines, Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in 
the Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill, 1996), 21; Gregory Mixon, “‘Good Negro-Bad 
Negro’: The Dynamics of Race and Class in Atlanta During the Era of the 1906 Riot,” 
Georgia Historical Quarterly 81 (Fall 1997): 593-621. 
xliii
 For reference to the first National Democratic Colored Convention, see the 
Huntsville Gazette, August 4, 1888; For analysis of the national convention, see 
Randall B. Woods, “C.H.J. Taylor and the Movement for Black Political 
Independence,” 128. For a typical view of a black Democratic club, see Huntsville 
Gazette, March 10, 1888. 
xliv
 Cleveland Gazette (quoting the Press), August 11, 1888.  
xlv
 The Southern News, October 15, 1892.  
xlvi
 Richmond Dispatch, August 10, 1876. 
xlvii
 Ibid., August 15, 1876. 
xlviii
 People’s Advocate, August 12, 1876. 
xlix
 Quotations from the Richmond Planet, March 15, 1890, cited in Harold S. 
Forsythe, “African American Churches, Fusion Politics in Virginia, and the 
Republican Gubernatorial Campaign in 1889,” in John Salient, ed., Afro-Virginian 
History and Culture (New York, 1999), 222. The threat of expulsion for any member 
of a black church congregation not supporting Langston was common. William F. 
Cheek, “A Negro Runs for Congress: John Mercer Langston and the Virginia 
Campaign of 1888,” Journal of Negro History 52 (January 1967): 14-34 (quotation on 
28). 
l
 Richmond Dispatch, February 20, 1877; Giggie, “Disband him from the church,” 
245-46. 
li
 Charles Nordoff, The Cotton States in the Spring and Summer of 1875 (New York, 
1976), 88-89. 
 33 
                                                                                                                                                              
lii
 Fleming, 776; for accounts of how black Republicans intimidated black Democrats 
see, for example, U.S. Congress, House, Affairs in Alabama, 43d Cong., 2d sess., H. 
Rept. 262, 151-55; Charles Nordoff, The Cotton States in the Spring and Summer of 
1875 (New York, 1876), 9-10; New York Times, November 4, 1874; King quoted in 
Elsa Barkley Brown, “To Catch the Vision of Freedom: Reconstructing Southern 
Black Women’s History, 1865-1880,” in Ann D. Gordon and Bettye Collier-Thomas, 
eds, African American Women and the Vote, 1837-1965 (Amherst, MA, 1997), 83.  
liii
 Anna J. Cooper, A Voice from the South (1892; New York, 1988), 140; Frances 
E.W. Harper, Sketches of Southern Life (Philadelphia, 1893), quoted in Gerda Lerner, 
ed., Black Women in White America (1972; New York, 1992), 249; Petersburg 
Lancet, November 17, 1883, quoted in Henry Lewis Suggs, “Virginia,” in Suggs, ed., 
The Black Press in the South, 379-421 (quotation on 390). 
liv
 U.S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 50th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 27, 
1888, S Rept. 19, Appendix, 8989-97 (Martinet’s letter can be found on 8993). 
lv
 Sheldon Hackney, From Populism to Progressivism (Princeton, 1969), 33-34 
lvi
 J. Morgan Kousser notes that the 1892 gubernatorial election demonstrated that 
‘ballot box fraud had become a vocation.’ J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of 
Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 
1880-1910 (New Haven, 1975), p. 43; Oates systemically countered the charges of 
electoral fraud at the 1894 election (the election in which he won). William C. Oates 
to John T. Morgan and James L. Pugh, March 12, 1896, John Tyler Morgan Papers, 
Correspondence, Box 6, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
lvii
 Robert David Ward and William Warren Rogers, Labor Revolt in Alabama: The 
Great Strike of 1894 (Tuscaloosa, AL, 1965), 125. 
lviii
 J.B. Blevins to William Coppinger, August 7, 1890, cited in Edwin S. Redkey, 
Black Exodus: Black Nationalist and Back-to-Africa Movements, 1890-1910 (New 
Haven, 1969), 8; Robert Saunders, “Populists and the Negro, 1893-1895,” Journal of 
Negro History 54 (January 1960): 240-69 (quotation on 256); Hackney, 34-35. 
lix
 Oates to Morgan and Pugh, March 12, 1896, Morgan Papers. 
lx
 Ibid. 
lxi
 Lynchburg Daily Advance, October 10, 1893, quoted in Charles E. Wynes, Race 
Relations in Virginia, 1870-1902 (1961; rpt. Totowa, NJ, 1971), 49. 
lxii
 Wynes, 49. 
lxiii
 People’s Party Paper, January 20, 1893, quoted in Joseph Gerteis, Class and the 
Color Line: Interracial Class Coalitions in the Knights of Labor and the Populist 
Movement (Durham, NC, 2007), 149. 
lxiv
 Washington Bee, April 22, June 10, July 22, 1893; Henry C. Smith to Grover 
Cleveland, December 15, 1893, in Series 2, reel 81, Cleveland Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress. 
lxv
 Colored American, December 10, 1898. 
lxvi
 Ibid.; The Wilmington massacre was later fictionalized in Charles Chesnutt’s 
novel, The Marrow of Tradition, published some three years after the event. Charles 
W. Chesnutt, The Marrow of Tradition (1901; London, 1994); For more on the 1898 
election, see Glenda Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of 
White Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-1920 (Chapel Hill, 1996). 
